US President Donald Trump, however, is not only pushing the historic turning point that Scholz put in motion in 2022 too far, but also sowing disruption in German domestic politics. In doing so, he is bringing the so-called “German Question” back into the current geopolitical scene. This term is historically associated with European anxieties about Germany’s strong tradition of militarism and nationalism.

After Germany’s reunification in October of 1990, fears emerged that the country’s central geographic position, industrial might and warmongering history could transform it into a potential threat to the rest of Europe. With the sudden strengthening of Germany, indeed, the delicate balance of power upon which the European Economic Community had been built was turned upside down. A newly empowered Germany, it was believed, could always trigger back latent nationalistic instincts.

Not surprisingly, British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher strongly opposed such reunification, dreading that a too-powerful Germany could undermine European stability and endanger her country’s security.

To deal with these fears, Germany’s Chancellor Helmut Kohl and French President Francois Mitterrand came up with the same answer: transforming the European Economic Community into a European political union. On this basis, the December 1991 Treaty of the European Union, approved in the Dutch city of Maastricht, came into being.

The reasons that had motivated both leaders in creating the European Union, however, were exactly the opposite. Kohl wanted to strengthen his country’s links with Europe to keep his fellow citizens’ nationalistic instincts in check, while Mitterrand wanted to strengthen Europe to keep Germany in check.

Trump 2.0’s actions, however, are turning things upside down by generating European anxieties about a Germany that could become militarily too strong and politically too nationalistic. In the words of historian and political scientist Liana Fix:

But left unchecked, German military dominance might eventually foster division within the continent, France remains uneasy about the fact that its neighbor is becoming a major military power … In the worst-case scenario, competition might return. France, Poland and other states could attempt to counterbalance Germany, which would divert attention away from Russia and leave Europe divided and vulnerable”.

The first and second avenues have converged, forcing European NATO members to make much larger defense disbursements while seeking European strategic autonomy. However, this is not as easy as it sounds. No other European country can match Berlin’s military expenditure, which by 2029 would budget $189 billion annually. That is, three times more than in 2022. In total, Germany plans to expend more than $750 billion on defense over the next four years. If this is accomplished, Germany would again become a great military power before the end of the decade.

However, with smaller economies, larger public debt or tight social welfare commitments, the rest of Europe will not be able to follow suit. Having the largest economy in Europe translates into much larger absolute spending, although, as a percentage of GDP, it could equal what smaller economies allocate to defense. Moreover, countries with higher public debt or tighter social welfare obligations, like France or Italy, have less fiscal space to raise defense outlays. As a result, while Germany was able to loosen its debt brake to invest heavily in defense, many others cannot do the same. All of the above create the conditions for Germany becoming Europe’s military Lemuel Gulliver. At least in conventional military terms.

The party is also becoming increasingly openly extremist. AfD officials use Nazi slogans, pose with their hands on their hearts in front of Adolf Hitler’s bunker, wear clothing from the mail-order catalogue of Germany’s largest neo-Nazi organization, and call themselves the “friendly face of National-Socialism.”

Not surprisingly, AfD was labeled as an “extremist” organization by Germany’s intelligence services.

Although important sectors of the population see with fear the rise of AfD, opinion polls show that it has already surpassed Chancellor Friedrich Merz’s conservative bloc as the country’s strongest political force. Under those circumstances, the active support this party receives from the President of the US and top members of his administration plays an important role in legitimizing and normalizing it in the eyes of the German people. Specially relevant in this regard was the Trump administration’s dismissal of the validity of a 1,100-page report by the German intelligence agency, labeling AfD as “a proven right-wing extremist organization.”

The possibility of a European military Gulliver controlled by a “proven right-wing extremist” government is thus an important one, courtesy of Mr. Trump. If this materializes, a powerful bulwark against liberal Europe would emerge. The largest economy and military in Europe would be at odds with both the EU and NATO, representing a major historical shift in post-1945 German foreign policy. If so, the “German Question” rather than Russian aggression would become Europe’s biggest problem.

Contrariwise, Germany’s military strength will certainly not be a bulwark against an aggressive Russia. Indeed, AfD is known as the most Russophile party in German politics, maintaining a friendly, mutually supportive relationship with the Kremlin.

After the first eight decades of continuous peace in Western Europe’s recorded history, Trump is actively sowing the seeds of upheaval.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.

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