US President Donald Trump, who is nothing if not direct, had threatened to intervene on behalf of demonstrators calling for the removal of Iran’s ruling theocratic regime. But by mid-week, he decided to hold off. The ostensible reason for his turnabout was the apparent decline in protest activity and the government’s failure to follow through with executions of protesters. The real reason, however, may have been US military advisers’ report that the US lacked adequate military assets in the region, i.e., an aircraft carrier battle group and associated attack aircraft, to deal Tehran a meaningful blow. Despite the postponement/cancellation, no one should dismiss Trump’s previous threat as mere characteristic Trumpian bluster. Recall that Mr. Trump voiced similar threats about attacking Venezuela in the run-up to America’s actual military intervention in early January, seizing Venezuelan dictator Nicolás Maduro and his wife and whisking them off to New York to stand trial on federal drug and other charges.

The demonstrations ignited in the final days of December, sparked by rapidly declining economic conditions in the Islamic Republic. Life there is plagued by shortages not only of goods and other life essentials but also heat, power, fuel and water. In the latter case, Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian has even talked about evacuating portions of Tehran to alleviate the pressure on the limited supply. In short, however, there is no solution at present to the country’s declining water sources.

Monthly inflation is averaging more than 40%. The rial’s value has plummeted in recent months, especially following the reimposition of UN Security Council sanctions on Iran last October for failing to comply with international nuclear requirements, including International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspections of Iranian nuclear research and production sites. Today, the rial ranks as the world’s weakest currency, at 1.4 million rials per US dollar.

There have been beatings, live fire directed at demonstrators and mass arrests. The government also shut down the nation’s internet system. Deaths numbered in the thousands, and arrests in the tens of thousands. Executions, including hangings, had been expected earlier in the week. Hospitals reported bodies piling up in morgues and injured people backed up in waiting rooms awaiting medical attention. Yet, the demonstrators persisted.

Iranian commentators able to communicate with the outside world reported that these demonstrations now rank as the nation’s biggest and most serious since the 1979 revolution, exceeding the major demonstrations of 2009 (aka the “Green Revolution”), 2017 and 2022 (aka “Woman, Life, Freedom”) after the security forces’ brutal murder of Mahsa Amini.

The government’s latest campaign of ferocious repression may have ultimately succeeded in tamping down the demonstrations. Increasingly violent repression has worked in the past. It’s the only tool the government now has. However, no amount of repression will change the motives of the protesters. The economy will worsen, water shortages will continue, sanctions will remain or even increase, and public dissent will grow. And the government will have no answer, except ever more brutal suppression.

Shortly after the demonstrations erupted, Trump warned the Iranian government not to use force against the demonstrators. The government fired back, warning the US and Israel to keep out and threatening to respond to external interference with massive attacks on US and Israeli targets throughout the region. The US had withdrawn some personnel from its Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar; Israel had shut down Ben Gurion Airport. It’s worth noting that the government made similar threats in the lead-up to the June bombings by Israel and the US of its nuclear sites; Iran’s actual response was muted. The country’s defenses suffered enormous damage from those attacks. While not defenseless, they’re less able to respond today than they were last June.

But the real question is not whether the US is able to intervene on behalf of demonstrators, but rather, should it? Iran isn’t Venezuela, where the US enjoyed the advantages of proximity and relatively easy access to the capital and its president. A special forces operation to grab Khamenei, who has no outstanding US arrest warrants, would be infinitely more complicated from thousands of miles away. And would removing the Supreme Leader, who reports suggest may now be mostly an aging and ill figurehead spending most of his time in seclusion, actually make a difference? After all, it’s the IRGC who executes his orders and makes all the security recommendations to him on a day-to-day basis. It’s logical to assume that in his absence, the IRGC leadership, which stands to lose the most in the event of a government collapse, would step into the breach.

And even if US actions triggered even greater mass uprisings and an eventual government fall, then what? The demonstrators have no apparent organization, unifying ideological message — other than regime removal — and no visible leadership. There are reasons for that. The regime’s security forces have been very effective at removing, e.g., detaining, imprisoning and executing, anyone appearing to criticize, much less threaten, it. The shelf life of a vocal regime opponent inside Iran is measured in hours, if not minutes.

One name that’s recently risen to attention is Crown Prince Reza Pahlavi, son of the late Shah, who’s been living in the US in exile since the revolution. Pahlavi has taken to the airwaves and social media to offer his solutions to the current crisis, including, unsurprisingly, ridding the nation of the current regime. In an insightful interview last October at the Council of Foreign Relations, Pahlavi embraced largely American values in calling for democracy, secular governance with respect and tolerance for all religious faiths and ethnicities — Iran has more than a dozen — and reestablishing political, economic and cultural ties with all nations, especially the US and the West.

However, it’s unclear and frankly unlikely that Pahlavi has a large following inside the country. The generation that knew and perhaps supported his father is long gone. Members of the former Shah’s government and military are either dead or aging abroad. And while few Iranians today know the brutality of the Shah’s regime, those who do understand that it pales in comparison to the sheer unrelenting viciousness of the current regime. So, Pahlavi may be a useful unifying figure for this phase, but it’s difficult to see him organizing a new government. He has a pleasant enough message for the country, but no organization to carry it out should the opportunity arise.

This begs the question: What might it mean for the government to fall? It seems certain that the IRGC will fight to the bitter end, regardless of the cost in lives and destruction to the country. A genuine collapse would require substantial defections by senior government officials and parliament members, resignations by military officers and most importantly, defections within the ranks of the IRGC. We have seen none of that so far. Opponents within the regime almost certainly exist. But matters have not yet reached the point where they are prepared to step up.

All this is important in the light of Trump’s threat. If the ultimate objective is regime change, then change to what? In 1979, it took an external invasion, wave after wave of arrests and executions of suspected dissidents, opponents and former members of the Shah’s government and military, and myriad groups fighting for power and influence before the Islamic Republic as we know it today emerged.

In light of all of this, there appears to be little that the US can do to effectively protect protesters, short of a major and most improbable invasion. 2026 is not 1953, when US and British intervention forever altered the course of Iranian history by ousting the elected prime minister and restoring the shah to the throne.

America’s options in Iran are limited but potentially (and debatably) helpful. However, it should be clear that if the US or any other country inserts itself into this movement, it will forever bear some measure of responsibility for the results. After all, where Iran is today is the result, in part, of US actions in 1953.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.

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